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The Long-Term Benefits of
Human Generosity in Indirect Reciprocity
high (group means range from 38% to 79%). As a conse-
quence, the mean image score of the players increased
from the first round on and reached a total average of
Claus Wedekind1 and Victoria A. Braithwaite
Institute of Cell, Animal, and Population Biology
University of Edinburgh
West Mains Road 3.39 (SE  0.31) at the end of the game. Whether or not
the personal account was displayed did not significantlyEdinburgh EH9 3JT
Scotland influence the players’ decisions (nested ANOVA includ-
ing group as a factor, effect of displaying account:United Kingdom
F1,102  0.31, p  0.57).
The receivers’ image score had an influence on the
donors’ decisions: in all 12 groups, receivers who gotSummary
something had on average a higher image score than
receivers who got nothing (Figure 1A; repeated mea-Among the theories that have been proposed to ex-
sures ANOVA, effect of giving or not giving: F1,99  35.0,plain the evolution of altruism [1–7] are direct reciproc-
p 0.0001; interaction with group: F11,99 1.9, p 0.04).ity [8–11] and indirect reciprocity [12–21]. The idea of
The donors’ decisions were also influenced by their ownthe latter is that helping someone or refusing to do so
image score: in 11 of 12 groups, donors with a low imagehas an impact on one’s reputation within a group. This
score were more likely to donate something and therebyreputation is constantly assessed and reassessed by
improve their own image score than donors with a rela-others and is taken into account by them in future
tively high image score (Figure 1B; effect of giving orsocial interactions. Generosity in indirect reciprocity
not giving: F1,99  217.2, p  0.0001; interaction withcan evolve if and only if it eventually leads to a net
group: F11,99  2.9, p  0.003).benefit in the long term. Here, we show that this key
Overall, players with a high mean image score earnedassumption is met. We let 114 students play for money
more money in the indirect reciprocity game than play-in an indirect and a subsequent direct reciprocity
ers with low image score (Figure 2A). This is largelygame. We found that although being generous, i.e.,
because the mean payoff per group increased with thegiving something of value to others, had the obvious
groups’ average generosity (r0.93, n12, p0.0001),short-term costs, it paid in the long run because it
and both less generous (Figure 2B) and more generousbuilds up a reputation that is rewarded by third parties
players (Figure 2C) profited from this group effect. Within(who thereby themselves increase their reputation). A
groups, the correlation coefficients between the players’reputation of being generous also provided an advan-
mean image score and their final account rangedtage in the subsequent direct reciprocity game, proba-
from 0.78 to 0.52 and was, on average, not signifi-bly because it builds up trust that can lead to more
cantly different from zero (one-sample signed rank test,stable cooperation.
p  0.57).
Building up a high image score has immediate costsResults and Discussion
that were apparent in the first few rounds of the indirect
reciprocity games (Figure 2D). However, the donors’ ten-Twelve separate groups of university students each
dency to reward high image scores increasingly com-played three different sessions. The first session, a re-
pensated for the costs of building and maintaining thesepeated simultaneous two-player Prisoner’s Dilemma
high image scores. From the tenth round on, the correla-[10, 22] (PD; a direct reciprocity game) was a practice
tion coefficient between image score and account wassession only. From then on, the students played for
positive in sign, and, in the last rounds of this session,money. The second session was an indirect reciprocity
this positive correlation was statistically significant (Fig-game. There are several ways to implement a reputation
ure 2D).that corresponds with the degree of generosity [14, 15,
17, 23, 24]. We chose to use an image score [14, 18]
that was graphically displayed. In the third session, the Carry-Over Effects to the Direct
students played the PD again but with the important Reciprocity Games
modification that their last image score from the indirect
Players who won the direct reciprocity game, i.e., who
reciprocity session was displayed. Given that a reputa-
received the additional £5.00 reward, had on average a
tion of being generous may build up trust [25], this last
higher mean image score during the indirect reciprocity
session was to test whether the generosity displayed in
game than players who did not win (Figure 3; F1,112 indirect reciprocity is rewarded in subsequent direct
8.15, p  0.005). The analogous pattern could be ob-
reciprocity games.
served within the groups: in 10 of the 12 groups, winners
in the PD had on average a higher mean image scores
The Indirect Reciprocity Game than losers (one-sample signed rank test, p  0.009).
The proportions of giving differed between the groups In order to describe the players’ strategy in the PD,
(ANOVA, F11,102  4.41, p  0.0001) but were in general we use four parameters: Pcc, Pcd (i.e., the probability of
playing c after self’s c and partner’s d), Pdc, and Pdd.
Players with a high image score played the PD differently1Correspondence: c.wedekind@ed.ac.uk
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Figure 3. The Mean Image Score during the Indirect Reciprocity
Game of Winners and Losers of the Subsequent Direct Reciprocity
Game
The image scores plotted here are residuals (means  SE) that
correct for round effects (as in Figure 1).
Figure 1. Influence of Image Score, i.e., Reputation, on the Deci-
sions in the Indirect Reciprocity Game
0.013), while Pcd and Pdd did not correlate with meanThe figure shows the image scores of (A) the receivers and of (B)
image score (r  0.04 and 0.15, p always  0.05). Tothe donors before the donor gives something (filled bars) or does
not give something (open bars). To correct for round effects, the test whether the players’ strategy in the PD depended
scores shown here are the participants’ average deviations from on their own and their partner’s image score from the
the mean image scores of the respective group and round. The previous indirect reciprocity game, we grouped all play-
figure gives the means  SE. The groups are ordered according to
ers as either “generous” and “nongenerous” as de-their average generosity (group 12 is highest).
scribed in Figures 2B and 2C. Generous players played
more cooperatively in the PD game if their partner was
generous than if he/she was not (paired t test, t63 than players with a low image score (multiple regression
on mean image score, with Pcc, Pcd, Pdc, and Pdd as pre- 3.22, p 0.002), and they achieved higher payoffs when
playing with generous rather than nongenerous partnersdictors: Fglobal 2.50, d.f. 4, p 0.047). This was mainly
because players with high image score played higher (t63  3.21, p 0.002). The same was true for nongener-
ous players who were also more cooperative (t48  2.87,Pcc (r  0.19, p  0.028) and higher Pdc (r  0.20, p 
Figure 2. Costs and Benefits of Image Score
within the Indirect Reciprocity Game
Regressions between the final account and
(A) the mean image score of each player (r 
0.35, p  0.0001). In (B) and (C), the regres-
sions are shown separately for the group
means (n 12): (B) for the less generous play-
ers of the groups (i.e., mean image score 
group mean; r 0.60, p 0.04) and (C) for the
more generous players of the groups (mean
image score  group mean; r  0.76, p 
0.004). (D) The Pearson’s correlation coeffi-
cients r between image score and account,
plotted separately for each round of the indi-
rect reciprocity game. Correlation coeffi-
cients within the shaded area are significantly
different from zero at p  0.05, two-tailed.
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The details of the game were displayed on a projector screenp  0.006) and achieved higher payoffs (t48  3.93, p 
visible to all players. The projector was connected to a computer0.0003) when playing with generous than with nongener-
run by the other operator. The rules of the game were explained atous players. As a consequence, pairs of generous play-
the beginning of each session (the written instructions are available
ers achieved a mean payoff of 3.5 (SE  0.06) points, on request from the authors). No information was given about the
while pairs of nongenerous players reached a mean of total number of interactions that would be played.
only 3.0 points (SE  0.07; F1,112  21.5, p  0.0001).
Nonreciprocal altruism among non-kin is frequently
The Rules of the Games
observed in humans. Such “generalized altruism” [26] In the first session, the participants played the PD [10, 22] with the
could, for example, be a cultural trait [27], or it could choices to cooperate (green) or defect (red). The computer randomly
have evolved because it normally provides a net fitness chose a pair of players under the constraint that each participant
played two games with a different partner each time. The othersbenefit [28]. Indirect reciprocity is one of the major evolu-
observed and waited to be chosen later. To make the game simulta-tionary concepts that could explain generous behavior.
neous, the lights were covered during this session so that only theWe have verified the two key predictions from the indi-
operators could see them, with choices being displayed on the
rect reciprocity models. (1) Generosity builds up some projector screen after both players had decided whether to cooper-
kind of reputation that is later rewarded by third parties. ate or defect. Only the last pair of choices, i.e., the last interaction,
(2) Building up the reputation of being generous is, on was displayed. The number of interactions per game was a random
number drawn between 2 and 15 (inclusive). The payoff matrix wasaverage, adaptive behavior in groups with many social
the following: if both players cooperated, they both got four points;interactions.
if both defected, they both got two points; if one player cooperatedThe generosity we observed in our experiments was
and the other player defected, the cooperator got one point, and
on average higher than expected from theory [14, 15, the defector got six points. After each game, the mean payoff of
17] but nevertheless rewarded by third parties to an both players was displayed. This practice session got the students
extent that eventually exceeded the costs of the dona- used to the PD [10, 22] and to our experimental setup. Thereafter,
each player received a new ID.tions. Such effects can only be seen in groups that have
The second session was an indirect reciprocity game as describedmany social interactions. The two types of rewards that
in [18], with some modifications: each player received a startingwe observed, i.e., from indirect and from direct reciproc-
account of £3.00. A pair of players was chosen: one in the donor
ity games, may lead to some sort of assortative group role, the other in the receiver role. Players were told that the same
formation with respect to willingness and ability for gen- pair would never play in the reversed role, so no direct reciprocity
erous behavior. was possible. The donor was asked to decide whether he/she would
give something to the receiver (green light) or not (red light). AfterIndirect reciprocity could be a kind of social glue that
this single interaction, a new pair of players was chosen. The costkeeps individuals together in a cooperative network.
of giving was £0.50, the benefit of receiving was £1.00. We donatedAlexander [12] argues that this is the basis of moral
the difference.
systems. A system of social norms would decide how We used an image score as suggested in [14] to implement reputa-
an individual’s behavior is translated into reputation that tion: giving something increased the image score of the donor by
may then be rewarded in any kind of currency [13]. one point, not giving decreased it by one point. This was graphically
displayed with an arrow that wandered from an initial image scoreGenerous players may not be aware of the fact that their
of 0 to a minimum of 6 or a maximum of 6 (these limits weregenerosity may be self-interested and strategic [12], but
arbitrarily chosen; they correspond to [14] and improved the viv-this is a necessary process for generosity in indirect
idness of the graphical display during the experiment). Both player’s
reciprocity to be evolutionary stable [14–17]. histories of giving or not were displayed with these arrows before
each interaction. We played 24 rounds per group. Each player played
Experimental Procedures once per round as donor and twice per two rounds as receiver.
To examine the potential impact of information about the players’
Participants and Experimental Setup current accounts [29, 30], the accounts were displayed through the
The subjects were biology students, mainly first year undergradu- game for seven groups but were only displayed at the end of the
ates (53% females), who were asked to voluntarily sign in for experi- session for the remaining five groups.
mental dates. They had never heard about indirect reciprocity in In the third session, each player played six PD games like those
their courses at the University of Edinburgh. We tested them in in the first session. During these games, both the players’ final image
groups of nine or ten. They were told that they would play anony- scores from the second session were displayed on the screen. The
mously and that their total earnings would be paid out in a way that players with the five highest mean payoffs per group received £5.00
would not reveal their identification number (ID) to us or to their each, in addition to their earnings from the second session.
colleagues [18].
Each subject chose a plug to connect an opaque box to an impen-
etrable tangle of cables, chose a seat within opaque partitions that Acknowledgments
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